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Introduction
To what extent is an online service provider (OSP)1 liable when a
customer uses its system to violate a copyright? For instance, suppose
a website designer displays someone else's copyrighted photographs
without permission. Can the owner of the copyright sue the company
that leased server space to the website? 2 Or suppose a music fan posts
a digitized version of a copyrighted song to an electronic bulletin
board. Can the songwriter then sue the company that offered the
infringing music fan a way to access the bulletin board? The law
provides no easy answers to these questions. The courts have grappled
with these issues very few times, and have yet to clearly signal the
extent to which OSPs will be liable for their users' copyright
infringement.3 Because of the intense interest in the way the law will
respond to emerging communication technology, and because this new
technology so easily facilitates copyright infringement,4 the issue of
OSP infringement liability fosters vociferous debate and speculation.
Commentators hold an array of opinions on the issue. Most would
agree, however, that existing law offers too little guidance, and the
courts could end up going any way on the issue.
Into this fragile mix add Fonovisa v. Cherry Auction.5 In this
recent case the Ninth Circuit allowed a record company to sue a swap
1. The term "online service provider" (OSP) is used broadly in this note. It refers to
anyone offering commercial access to various types of online computer networks, including
bulletin board services (BBSs), large commercial content providers such as America
Online or Compuserve, and Internet service providers (ISPs) that act as passive conduits to
the Internet. OSP is used to refer to services that offer customers a way to connect to a
network, as well as services that lease space on network-connected computers to host
websites or other services available to the public. As the world becomes increasingly
connected to computer networks, the distinctions among these various types of services
blur. See Mark Walsh, Impass Over Online Copyrights; Why a Proposed Bill is Polarizing
the Internet's Two Biggest Industries, RECORDER, May 9, 1996, at 1. ISPs that once acted as
mere pipelines to the Internet now run websites with customer information and directories
and lease space on servers for customer websites. BBSs that were once self-contained now
offer customers a way to connect to the Internet. Large commercial online services that
once generated all of their own content now allow customers to browse the worldwide web.
2. A website must reside on a webserver, which is typically an expensive computer
with a continuous, high speed connection to the Internet. Many website operators do not
maintain their own webservers, but instead lease server space from someone else.
3. Walsh, supra note 1.
4. Scott K. Pomeroy, Comment, Promoting the Progress of Science and the Useful
Arts in the Digital Domain Copyright, Computer Bulletin Boards, and Liability for
Infringement of Others, 45 EMORY L.J. 1035, 1037 (1996).
5. 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996) [hereinafter Fonovisa II].
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meet for copyright infringement committed by the swap meet's
vendors. The vendors rented a stall from the defendant and sold
counterfeit music cassettes that infringed the plaintiff Fonovisa's
copyright. 6 The Ninth Circuit reversed a district court opinion 7 and
held that the swap meet could be sued under theories of contributory
infringement and vicarious infringement.8
The appellate court struggled against the weight of existing
doctrine to find Cherry Auction liable, and in doing so, extended the
scope of third-party copyright infringement liability to previously
unseen levels. Never before had third-party infringement liability
been assigned to a party so disconnected from the actual infringer or
the infringement. This extension of third party infringement liability
may make it much easier to hold OSPs liable for their customers'
infringement. For OSPs and those that rely on their service, this could
be disastrous.
Part I of this note briefly visits the doctrines of vicarious and
contributory copyright infringement. Part II discusses various views of
the extent to which OSPs should be held liable for user infringement,
and recounts the ways that courts have applied copyright infringement
principles to OSPs. Part III discusses the flawed analysis of the
Fonovisa decision, points out how the case extends third party liability
to new levels, and explains how the opinion sets a precedent that may
be used unfairly against OSPs. Part IV recommends that the courts do
not rely on Fonovisa to decide OSP liability, and instead stick with
more traditional concepts of third party liability, applied cautiously.
I
Third Party Copyright Liability and Its Application to OSPs.
A. Third-party copyright infringement
The owner of a copyright has broad rights to reproduce,
distribute, perform and display his copyrighted work.9 Anyone
6. Id. at 260.
7. Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 1492 (E.D. Cal. 1994)
[hereinafter Fonovisa 1.
8. Fonovisa 11, 76 F.3d at 261.
9. 17 U.S.C. § 106 states:
the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to
authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
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breaching these rights is a direct infringer, 10 and subject to an array of
civil and criminal penalties.11 Direct infringement has a strict liability
standard - it does not require intent or any particular state of mind.12
The Copyright Act of 1976 lacks express language to impose liability
on any party other than the one actually engaged in infringement. 13
This does not, however, shelter those who assist in infringement, but
stop short of directly infringing. Under theories of third-party liability,
parties who do not actively engage in infringing activities can be held
liable for their connection to another's infringement. 14
Courts recognize two ways that a person can be held liable for
someone else's copyright infringement activity:, contributory
infringement and vicarious infringement. 15 In Sony Corporation of
America v. Universal City Studios. Inc.,16 the Supreme Court
articulated the rationale of applying these doctrines to copyright
infringement: "vicarious liability is imposed in virtually all areas of the
law, and the concept of contributory infringement is merely a species
of the broader problem of identifying the circumstances in which it is
just to hold one individual accountable for the actions of another." 17
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by
sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the
copyrighted work publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual
images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted
work publicly. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1996).
10. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1996).
11. 17 U.S.C. §§ 502,503,505, 506, 509, and 510 (1996).
12. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (1996).
13. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 435 (1984).
This is in contrast to the Patent Act, which imposes infringement liability on anyone who
"actively induces infringement of a patent." 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (1994). The Patent Act also
spells out what constitutes "contributory" infringement. Id. § 271(c).
14. Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 435.
15. The distinction between the two claims is somewhat muddied. 'The courts have
been less than precise in their delineation of the contours of contributory versus vicarious
liability for copyright infringement." ITSI T.V. Prods., Inc. v. California Authority of
Racing Fairs, 785 F. Supp. 854, 861 (E.D. Cal. 1992).
16. 464 U.S. 417.
17. Id. at 435.
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1. Contributory Infringement
Contributory copyright infringement is based on "the basic
common law doctrine that one who knowingly participates or furthers
a tortious act is jointly and severally liable with the prime
tortfeasor ..... ,18 Contributory infringement stems from the enterprise
liability concept of tort law.19 In Gershwin Publishing Corp. v.
Columbia Artists Management the Second Circuit declared that "one
who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes, or
materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another may be
held liable as a contributory infringer." 20 The Gershwin test has
become the standard test for contributory infringement. 21 The
essential elements of contributory infringement have been identified
as "knowledge" and "participation.
'
"
22
These elements are not talismanic; not all courts define
contributory infringement so simply. Some courts emphasize that the
participation of the third party must be "substantial participation" in
order to constitute infringement.23 Sometimes the second prong of the
test is called "material contribution," 24 which can affect the tone of a
court's analysis. Other courts have written that one must "authorize"
18. Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark Pi Records, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 399
(S.D.N.Y. 1966).
19. Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d 1159,
1162 (2d Cir. 1971).
20. Id.
21. See, e.g,. Fonovisa II, 76 F.3d at 264; Religious Technology Center v. Netcom
On-Line Communications, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1373 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Polygram
International Publishing, Inc. v. Nevada/TIG Inc., 855 F. Supp. 1314, 1333 (D. Mass. 1984);
Casella v. Morris, 820 F.2d 362, 365 (11th Cir. 1987); Demetriades v. Kafmann, 690 F.
Supp. 289,294 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Redd Home, Inc. 749
F.2d 154, 160 (3d Cir. 1984).
22. Demetriades, 690 F. Supp. at 293.
23. One court, in analyzing the possibility of a realtor contibutorily infringing
copyrighted architectural plans by selling a "copycat house," noted, "[wie are familiar with
no concept of justice that would permit extension of third-party liability in this case on so
attenuated a basis. Something more-deriving from one's substantial involvement-is
needed." Demetriades, 690 F. Supp. at 294. Furthermore, "participation in the infringing
activity must be 'substantial,' R&R Recreation Products, Inc. v. Joan Cook Inc., 1992 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 5176, *7 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (citing Demetriades, 690 F. Supp. at 294). The
district court in Fonovisa stated the elements for contributory infringement as: "(1)
knowledge of the copyright infringing activity, and (2) substantial participation, i.e.
inducement, cause or material contriubtion, to the infringing conduct of another." 847 F.
Supp. at 1496; see also Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1375.
24. Fonovisa II, 76 F.3d at 264.
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infringement to be contributorily liable. In Sony, for instance, the
Supreme Court recognized the doctrine and described the
contributory infringer as one who "was in a position to control the use
of copyrighted works by others and had authorized the use without
permission from the copyright owner." 25 Analysis of contributory
infringement, then, is somewhat imprecise.
2. Vicarious Infringement
Vicarious liability is based on the relationship between the
defendant and the direct infringer, rather than the defendant's
involvement in the infringing activity. 26 This theory of liability evolved
from the agency rule of respondeat superior, by which an employer is
liable for torts committed by his servants within the scope of
employment. 27 In the context of copyright infringement, courts have
not adhered to the requirement of an employer-employee
relationship, and have found vicarious liability in cases of independent
contract and license as well.28 In Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L.
Green,29 the seminal vicarious copyright infringement case, the
Second Circuit established that a party with the "right and ability to
supervise" infringing activity and "obvious and direct financial
interest" in it can be held vicariously liable, even without knowledge
of the infringement. 30 The two essential elements of the test for
vicarious infringement have been referred to as "control" and
"benefit. ,,31
Shapiro involved a department store chain, H.L. Green, that
leased its record departments to an independent operator. The
independent operator used its record concessionaires to sell
counterfeit records, infringing the plaintiff Shapiro's copyrights.
Although the concessionaires were technically independent, H. L.
Green was substantially involved in their business, even taking a share
25. 464 U.S. at 437.
26. William 0. Ferron Jr., et al., On-line Copyright Issues: Recent Case Law and
Legislative Changes (Part II), COMPUTER LAW., Feb. 1997, at 14.
27. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. (citations omitted). This test has been widely adopted. See RCA/Ariola Int'l,
Inc. v. Thomas & Grayston Co., 845 F.2d 773, 781 (8th Cir. 1988); Columbia Pictures v.
Redd Home, Inc., 749 F.2d 154, 160 (3d Cir. 1984); Frank Music Corp. v. Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer, Inc., 886 F.2d 1545, 1553 (9th Cir. 1990).
31. Demetriades 690 F. Supp. at 294; Polygram, 855 F. Supp. at 1324.
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of their profits. Green wielded substantial control over them, having a
say even in whom they hired and fired. The plaintiff sought to sue not
only the independent operator, but also H. L. Green, who had leased
it the space.32
The Shapiro court, in developing this vicarious liability test,
looked at two contrasting lines of cases dealing with third-party
infringement. One line of cases dealt with landlord-tenant scenarios. 33
The courts in these cases found that landlords were not liable for their
tenants' copyright infringement if the landlords had no knowledge of
the infringement, did not contribute to it, exercised no supervision
over the tenant, and received no financial benefit from the
infringement activity other than the fixed rental fee.3
4
In the second line of cases, the "dance hall cases," 35 the courts
found that the owners of entertainment venues were liable for their
entertainers' infringement if the owners had control over the premises
and derived direct financial benefit from the audiences who enjoyed
the infringing entertainment. 36 In the dance hall cases, it did not
matter whether the direct infringers were employees or agents of the
venue owner.37 The notion of respondeat superior was stretched to
hold the owners liable if they had control and received a financial
benefit. The Shapiro court saw its case as closer to the dance hall
model, and fashioned its two-part "control"/"benefit" test based on
it.38
Even today, when courts apply the Shapiro test, they will often
justify a vicarious infringement claim by characterizing a set of facts as
more or less akin to a "dance hall case" or a landlord-tenant
scenario. 39 One court posed the question: "Where along the spectrum
of fact patterns from nightclub to landlord does the defendant
stand?"40
32. Shapiro, 316 F.2d at 305-07.
33. See, e.g., Deutsch v. Arnold, 98 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1938); Freemont v. Aeolian Co.,
254 F. 592 (S.D.N.Y.1918).
34. Shapiro, 316 F.2d at 305-07.
35. See, e.g., Buck v. Jewell LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191 (1931); Dreamland
Ballroom, Inc. v. Shapiro, 36 F.2d 354; Famous Music Corp. v. Bay State Harness Horse
Racing & Breeding Assn., Inc., 554 F.2d 1213 (1977).
36. Shapiro, 316 F. 2d at 307.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 308.
39. See, e.g., Fonovisa 11, 76 F.3d at 262.
40. Polygram, 855 F. Supp. at 1325.
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B. Infringement Liability of Online Service Providers
1. Brief Summary of Case Law on OSP Liability
There is great interest in the potential copyright infringement
liability of OSPs,4 1 and little clarifying law.42 One commentator wrote
in 1989, "legal issues surrounding computer bulletin boards comprise a
land with no maps and few native guides." 43 These words remain true.
Only three federal court opinions have addressed OSP infringement
liability and they have done little to sharpen the contours of the law.
In Playboy Enterprises. Inc. v. Frena,44 the first case to reach the
federal courts on the issue of OSP liability, a district court found the
operator of a bulletin board liable for direct infringement, and
therefore did not need to approach the doctrines of vicarious or
contributory liability. The OSP in this case profited from allowing
users to upload and download digitized versions of the plaintiff's
copyrighted photographs.45 The OSP placed its name and phone
number on the photographs, and stored them as files called
"Playmate" or "Playboy." 46 The court held, that as a matter of law,
the defendant directly infringed upon Playboy's rights to distribute
and display its copyrighted works.47
41. Many commentators have written on the topic of third-party copyright
infringement liability of online service providers. See, e.g., Kelly Tickle, Note, The Vicarious
Vicarious Liability of Electronic Bulletin Board Operators for the Copyright Infringement
Occurring on Their Bulletin Boards, '80 IOWA L. REV. 391, 416 (1995); Niva Elkin-Koren,
Copyright Law and Social Dialogue on the Information Superhighway: The Case Against
Copyright Liability of Bulletin Board Operators, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 345, 350
(1993); Andrea Sloan Pink, Comment, Copyright Infringement Post Isoquantic Shift:
Should Bulletin Board Services Be Liable? 43 UCLA L. REV. 587 (1995); Edward A.
Cavazos, and G. Chin Chao, The Emerging Law of Computer Networks: System Operator
Liability for a User's Copyright Infringement, 4 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 13 (1995); M.
David Dobbins, Note, Computer Bulletin Board Operator Liability for Users' Infringing
Acts, 94 MICH. L. REV. 217 (1995).
42. Walsh, supra note 1. See also John Carmichael, Comment, In Support of the White
Paper: Why Online Service Providers Should Not Receive Immunity From Traditional
Notions of Vicarious and Contributory Liability for Copyright Infringement, 16 LOY. L.A.
ENT. L.J. 759, 773 n.66 (1996).
43. Loftus E. Becker, Jr., The Liability of Computer Bulletin Board Operators for
Defamation Posted by Others, 22 CONN. L. REV. 203, 205 (1989).
44. 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993)
45. Playboy, 839 F. Supp. at 1554.
46. Id. at 1559.
47. Id.
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In Sega Enterprises. Ltd. v. MAPHIA,48 a district court held that
the defendant MAPHIA, a BBS, could be liable for direct and
contributory infringement of the plaintiff's copyright.49 MAPHIA was
a bulletin board devoted to various nefarious activities, 50 among them
distributing illegal copies of the plaintiff's computer games. 51 Not only
did the defendant allow uploading and downloading of the games, it
also sold devices designed specifically to copy the games.52 MAPHIA
encouraged and profited from these activities. 53 These defendants
were involved in copyright infringement to a far greater extent than
the defendants in Playboy. However, in finding them liable for
copyright infringement, the court seemed to focus on the fact that the
defendants had knowledge of the infringement.54 This is relevant only
to contributory liability, as direct infringement does not require
knowledge. Although the court allowed a claim of contributory
infringement as well, its analysis focused on rationalizing contributory
liability, rather than direct infringement.55  Nevertheless, the
defendant's actions fit within the scope of both contributory and direct
infringement.
In the most recent case involving this issue, Religious Technology
Center v. Netcom On-line Communication Services. Inc.,56 the district
court held that the defendants' internet service provider whose system
was used for infringement could be sued for contributor
infringement,57 but not for direct 58 or vicarious infringement. 59
Defendant Netcom provided internet access to the BBS on which the
direct infringer posted excerpts of the plaintiff's copyrighted books.60
Netcom received the infringing messages from the BBS, stored them
for a period of time, and distributed them via the Internet to other
48. 857 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
49. Sega, 857 F. Supp. at 687.
50. Id. at 684-85.
51. Id. at 683.
52. Id. at 684-85.
53. Id. at 687.
54. Id. at 626-87
55. Id.
56. 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
57. Id. at 1375.
•58. Id. at 1373.
59. Id. at 1377.
60. Id. at 1366.
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server computers. 61
The court first rejected the claim of direct infringement. 62 The
court clarified that there were "copies" made during the message
storage process, and the plaintiff's copyright was thus infringed. 63
However, Netcom should not be responsible as a direct infringer
.merely because its computers were involved, if it was system users,
rather than Netcom, who posted the copies. According to the court, a
theory of contributory infringement is more appropriate for an OSP.64
The court distinguished Netcom from the defendants in Playboy and
Sega, who were far more involved in infringement, and questioned the
conclusion of those courts that OSPs can be held directly liable for
infringement caused by users. 65 The court concluded that direct
infringement liability is unwise and unfair.66
The court next turned to the claim of contributory
infringement.67 Applying the Gershwin test it identified the elements
of contributor infringement as "knowledge" and "substantial
participation." 6 The plaintiff, having informed Netcom of the
infringement, raised a significant question of fact as to whether the
"knowledge" prong was satisfied. 9 The court then turned to the
"substantial participation" element.70  The court distinguished
Netcom's role from that of a landlord who passively leased space to an
infringing tenant. 71 A passive landlord might fail to satisfy the
"substantial participation" prong, the court stated, but "a service that
allows for the automatic distribution of all Usenet postings.., goes
well beyond renting a premises to an infringer." 72 The court compared
Netcom's role to that of a radio station airing infringing
broadcasting. 73
61. Id. at 1367-68.
62. Id. at 1367-73.
63. Id. at 1368. That this even needed to be analyzed at length demonstrates the
infancy of this area of law.
64. Id. at 1368-69.
65. Id. at 1370-72.
66. Id. at 1372-73.
67. Id. at 1373.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1373, 1375.
70. Id. at 1375.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
19971
The court also distinguished Netcom from the way the district
court characterized Cherry Auction in Fonovisa L74 In Fonovisa I, the
district court held that Cherry Auction, by merely renting space to a
vendor, did not participate sufficiently in the vendor's infringement to
warrant contributory liability.75 Netcom's operation of its computer
system constituted greater participation than that of Cherry
Auction.76
The court also dismissed the vicarious infringement claim.77 It
found that Netcom satisfied the "control" prong of the test78 , as it had
the requisite amount of control over the infringers through its
contractual terms and conditions, its user indemnification
requirement, and the fact that it was capable of devising a way of
purging certain messages.79 Netcom did not, however, glean any direct
financial benefit from the infringing activities, and thus failed the
second prong of the vicarious infringement test.80 The court based its
decision on the fact that Netcom received a fixed fee, very much like a
landlord, and did not receive a percentage of any infringing activities
or attract extra business because of them. 81 The relationship between
Netcom and its subscribers was more like that of a landlord and
tenant, rather than a night club and its hired performers.
In concluding that Netcom did not meet the "financial benefit"
prong, and could not be sued for vicarious infringement, the court
relied on the district court's opinion in Fonovisa L The plaintiff
asserted that Netcom benefited financially from the reputation of
being a regulation-free service provider, and thus had a sufficient
financial stake in the infringement. 82 But the court pointed to the
district court opinion in Fonovisa I which held that Cherry Auction,
by merely leasing space to an infringing vendor, did not meet the
"financial benefit" prong of the vicarious infringement test.83 The
court compared Netcom's business to that of Cherry Auction, and
74. 847 F. Supp. 1492.
75. 907 F. Supp. at 1375.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
79. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1375-76.
80. Id. at 1376-77.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1377.
83. Id. (citing Fonovisa 1, 847 F. Supp. at 1496).
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concluded that because there was no direct financial benefit from
infringement, there was no vicarious liability.84
2. Where the Law on OSP Infringement Liability Currently Stands
There are several different schemes by which OSPs could be
subjected to liability for user infringement, and no one is certain which
will eventually become the standard. If the decision of Playboy v.
Frena holds any sway, OSPs may be subject to strict liability, as direct
infringers, for copyright violations by users of their systems. Some
would argue that this is appropriate.85 Most, however, consider this an
unfair scheme. The defendant in Playboy was heavily involved in the
infringing activity. If he was a direct infringer, it was based on his
actual involvement, rather than his status as the provider of the system
on which files were transferred. Playboy has been criticized, was
rejected in Netcom,86 and most likely does not signal a future of strict
liability for OSPs.
At the opposite end of the spectrum, others argue for total
immunity for OSPs, treating them as common carriers. 87 The
defendant in Netcom argued that it was a passive conduit for
information, and likened itself to a common carrier, arguing that it
should be exempt from liability for infringement occurring on its
system.88 The Clinton Administration's Information Infrastructure
Task Force disagrees, believing that this status should not be granted
to OSPs, as they typically have far more control over the use of their
systems than a common carrier such as a telephone company.89 The
Task Force notes that OSPs are not natural monopolies, like other
common carriers. 90 While common carrier status would offer
immunity from infringement suits, it does have its pitfalls. Common
carriers are subject to extensive government regulation, an anathema
to the free-wheeling philosophy of cyberspace.
84. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1376-77.
85. See, e.g., Joseph V. Meyers III, Note, Speaking Frankly About Copyright
Infringement on Computer Bulletin Boards: Lessons to be Learned from Frank Music,
Netcom, and the White Paper, 49 VAND. L. REv. 439, 474 (1996).
86. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1370-71.
87. Pink, supra note 41, at 629.
88. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1370.
89. INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT ON THE WORKING
GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 122 (1995) [hereinafter White Paper].
90. Id.
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Most likely, OSPs will be subject to some level of third party
infringement liability for copyright violations occurring on their
systems. Contributory infringement has been the chosen doctrine so
far.91 The court in Sega, while it condoned theories of direct and
contributory infringement, really seemed to be analyzing contributory
liability.92 The Netcom court approved of applying contributory
infringement principles to OSPs.93 If an OSP is subject to contributory
infringement liability for the activities of its users, to what extent will
the doctrine apply? Is the "knowledge" prong met by actual
knowledge, or could a "reason to know" standard apply? Does merely
operating a system constitute "substantial participation," as the
Netcom court decided,94 or must an OSP be involved to some greater
degree?
Courts have yet to use a vicarious infringement theory to hold an
OSP liable. Some would argue that this is an appropriate standard,
though many others find it dangerous. 95 If this standard were used,
would running a system in itself, along with the Ordinary control an
OSP has over users, be enough to satisfy the "control" prong, as the
Netcom court believed? 96 The Netcom court seemed to believe that
the "financial benefit" element could be satisfied only if the OSP was
paid a portion of the profits of infringement.97 Could an OSP be
considered to profit from offering an "infringement-friendly" or "no
questions asked" environment? 98
91. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1373-75. Some argue for a statute that declares this
the appropriate standard for OSPs. See also Pink, supra note 41, at 629.
92. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1371 (citing Sega, 857 F. Supp at 686).
93. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1373-75.
94. Id. at 1375.
95. See, e.g., David Dobbins, Computer Bulletin Board Operator Liability for Users'
Infringing Acts, 94 MICH. L. REV. 217,224 (1995). It has often been said that the OSP-user
relationship is like that of the landlord and tenant. See Tickle, supra note 41.
96. A "practical control" standard has been proposed. See Tilman E. Self, III, The
Vicarious Liability of Trade Show Organizers for the Copyright Infringements of
Exhibitors, 5 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 81, 98 (1996). Perhaps the theoretical ability of an
OSP to police its users should not satisfy the control prong, as it is far more difficult to
patrol cyberspace than actual space. See Ian C. Ballon, Pinning the Blame in Cyberspace:
Towards a Coherent Theory for Imposing Vicarious Copyright, Trademark and Tort
Liability for Conduct Occurring Over the Internet, 18 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. 729, 761
(1996).
97. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1376-77.
98. Some would argue that, for OSPs, infringement profiteering should have to be
shown to prove vicarious infringement, as "financial interest" is too difficult to evaluate
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Some urge an escape from current doctrine, arguing that the
existing categories of infringement liability do not translate to the
world of modern communication technologies. 99 Copyright law has
evolved in the past in response to new technology. l u Proponents of
this view argue for new doctrines or alternative OSP-specific
applications of existing law.10 1
II
The Fonovisa Holding and How It Extends Third Party
Infringement Liability
A. History and Facts
The Cherry Auction, in Fresno, California, is a typical "swap
meet" or "flea market" in which small spaces are leased to vendors on
a daily basis, and in which the public is allowed to browse and
purchase a variety of items from the individual vendors. 10 2 The
Auction is a popular shopping area for Fresno's Latin American
community, and offers a wide variety of merchandise, including
clothing, stereo equipment, produce, and live poultry.10 3 The swap
meet's myriad offerings have also included bootleg cassette tapes of
Latin music.104 Music pirates were a persistent problem at the Cherry
Auction. In 1991, the Fresno County Sheriff's Department confiscated
38,014 counterfeit tapes in a raid of the Auction.'0 5 The problem
continued. The Sheriff's Department and Fonovisa investigators
spotted infringing vendors at the auction several times in 1992 and
without it. See Ballon, supra note 96.
99. See, e.g., Elkin-Koren, supra note 41 (arguing that existing copyright law does not
fit well into a world of digitized communication).
100. Pomeroy, supra note 4.
101. See, e.g., Tickle, supra note 41 (arguing that the lessor-lessee paradigm of
vicarious liability is most analogous to BBS operators, but also arguing for a requirement
of knowledge).
102. Fonovisa II, 76 F.3d at 261.
103. Christina Medina, Cherry Auction Keeps Up Market Tradition - From Produce to
Glad Rags, Almost Anything is Here, FRESNO BEE, march 20, 1995, at B 1.
104. Fonovisa 1, 847 F. Supp. at 1494.
105. Id. To show its appreciation, the Association of Latin-American Record
Manufacturers presented its "Gold Record" award to the Vice/Intelligence Unit of the
Fresno County Sheriff's Department. In addition to the cassette tapes, the detectives
seized more than one million tape labels and sophisticated duplicating equipment. Michelle
Daniels, Sheriff's Unit Receives 'Gold Record'Award, FRESNO BEE, Feb. 17, 1994, at B2.
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B. District Court Holding
Fonovisa filed suit against Cherry Auction in April 1993.107 Its
claims included direct, contributory, and vicarious copyright
infringement. 10 8 District Court Judge Robert Coyle did not view any
of these claims as viable, and dismissed them pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 10 9 The court curtly dismissed the direct
copyright infringement claim because Fonovisa failed to show how
Cherry Auction directly infringed. 110 It was the vendors, not the
auction, who duplicated and sold the counterfeit tapes.111
The court then analyzed and dismissed the contributory
infringement claim. 112 The court summarized the elements of the
claim as "knowledge" of the activities and "substantial participation"
in the infringement. 113 It found that Cherry Auction satisfied the
"knowledge" element, as it was well aware of the music pirates and
the infringement. But the Auction did not satisfy the "substantial
participation" element, as it was not involved at all in the
infringement. 114 The court noted that the defendants had not
"promoted, advertised... [or] encouraged the sale of counterfeit
products, or protected the identity of the infringers. '" 115 Merely
renting booth space was "passive" participation, the court stated, too
insubstantial to satisfy the test of Gershwin and warrant a finding of
contributory liability.
The court then dismissed the plaintiff's claim of vicarious
infringement. Identifying the elements of the claim as "financial
interest" and "right and ability to supervise," 117 the court found that
Cherry Auction had neither a financial interest in the infringement,
106. Fonovisa I, 847 F. Supp. at 1494-95.
107. Id. at 1495.
108. Id. at 1494.
109. Fonovisa II, 76 F.3d. at 261.
110. Fonovisa 1, 847 F. Supp. at 1495.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1496.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1497.
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nor the requisite level of supervisory power over its vendors.
118
Unlike the defendant in Shapiro, Cherry Auction did not have "a
priori supervisory power; that is, the power to supervise the direct
infringers in the general course of business." 119 While the plaintiff did
have the right to exclude vendors for infringement, it did not maintain
control over what its vendors sold, how much they charged, or whom
they hired. The Auction's level of supervision was not, the court
reasoned, enough to subject it to liability in the respondeat superior
sense.120 Briefly mentioning the second prong of the test, the court
also noted that the defendant, by renting a modestly priced space to
the infringers, did not receive a direct financial benefit from infringing
activities.121
C. The Ninth Circuit Reversal, and How the Holding Extended the
Doctrines of Third Party Infringement Liability
Fonovisa appealed the dismissal of the claims for contributory
and vicarious liability. 122 The case was the first to reach the federal
appellate level on the question of whether a swap meet can be held
vicariously or contributorily liable for the copyright infringement of
vendors. 123 The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of
the claims and found them to be valid causes of action.124 Fonovisa
was given the right to sue Cherry Auction for contributory and
vicarious infringement.
1. Vicarious Infringement Claim
The court first analyzed the vicarious infringement claim. 125
Contrary to the district court, the Ninth Circuit found that Cherry
Auction met both the "control" and "financial benefit" prongs of the
vicarious infringement test.126  In analyzing the defendant's
supervisory power over the vendors, the "control" prong, the court
118. Id. at 1496-97.
119. Id. at 1497.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Fonovisa I1, 76 F.3d. at 261.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 264.
125. Id. at 261-64.
126. Id. at 262-63.
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rejected any analogy to the landlord-tenant relationship. 127 The court
noted the defendant's contractual ability to patrol its premises and
terminate vendors for any reason, and compared it to the level of
control wielded by H.L. Green in Shapiro.128 Was this a proper
analysis? In Shapiro, the defendant Green arguably had far more
power over its vendor than Cherry Auction wielded over the swap
meet hawkers. Green did not just supply the building in which the
infringing vendor was located, it also managed its cash flow, calculated
its payroll, took a percentage of its receipts, and retained the right to
make decisions about its employees. 129 Green's power was clearly
"supervisory," but Cherry Auction's seemed much less so.
Further satisfying the "control" prong, the court said, was the
Auction's power as the promoter and organizer of the swap meet,
similar to that of the defendant in Gershwin.130 This analogy is also
somewhat weak, given the facts of Gershwin. In Gershwin, the
defendant CAMI organized musical performances for which it knew
there would be no copyright license.131 CAMI knew in advance the
songs that would be played, and it deliberately failed to get permission
to use them. Indeed, it printed brochures for the shows, listing the
songs to be played. 132 By contrast, the Cherry Auction merely rented
spaces on its lot, and surely could not have inventoried the wares of
each vendor prior to the swap meet. The defendant in Gershwin knew
exactly what would occur before each show. 133 Swap meets are, by
nature, ever changing, and it would be impossible to determine, before
opening, exactly what will be sold. Knowledge is power, and Cherry
Auction wielded nowhere near the power of CAMI.
Grasping for further support for its finding that Cherry Auction
satisfied the "control" element, the court also cited Polygram
International Publishing Inc. v. Nevada/TIG, Inc.134 This district court
case included a finding that the organizer of a trade show could be
held vicariously liable for infringing performances conducted by show
127. Id. at 262.
128. Id. at 262-63 (citing Shapiro, 316 F. 2d at 304).
129. Shapiro, 316 F.2d at 306.
130. Fonovisa II, 76 F.3d. at 263 (citing Gershwin Pub. Corp. v. Columbia Artists
Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1163 (2d Cir. 1971)).
131. Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1161.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1163.
134. 855 F. Supp. 1314 (D. Mass. 1984).
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participants. 135 The court in Polygram found that the defendant
possessed the requisite power over infringers because it controlled
them through rules and regulations, policed its premises to: ensure
compliance with the rules, and promoted the show including the
infringers.136 In Fonovisa II, the Ninth Circuit chose to rely on this
anomalous district court opinion, ignoring the fact that the findings
were not an actual holding, but mere "evaluative findings,"' 137 and
therefore dicta.138
Further, the Ninth Circuit chose to completely ignore Artists'
Music. Inc. v. Reed Publishing (USA), Inc.,139 another recent district
court case involving facts that are identical to Polygram but resulting
in an opposite holding. The exhibitors at a trade show infringed
copyrights with performances of music, and the court held that Reed
Music, the organizer of the show could not be held liable as a vicarious
infringer.140 The Artists' Music court found that "the relationship
between trade show sponsors and trade show exhibitors is the legal
and functional equivalent of the relationship between landlords and
tenants,"'141 and that a fixed rental rate does not constitute direct
financial benefit. 142 This case is more in line with established
infringement liability principles, and the Ninth Circuit's failure to cite
it allowed it to further skew its holding in Fonovisa II.
The court then turned to the "financial benefit" element of the
vicarious infringement test.143 It strained to explain how Cherry
Auction directly benefited financially from the infringing activity of
the vendors. 144 The court held that the swap meet's financial benefit
came from the daily rental fee paid by the vendors, the entrance fee
135. Id. at 1331.
136. Id. at 1329.
137. Id. at 1331.
138. The plaintiffs in Polygram failed to establish a prima facie case of copyright
infringement because they failed to show that the direct infringers, the exhibitors, lacked a
license to perform the allegedly infringed works. Summary judgment was thus granted for
the defendants. The court only discussed vicarious liability "in order to create a full record
that includes all potentially material factual finding." 855 F. Supp. at 1323-24.
139. 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6395 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
140. Id. at *18.
141. Id. at *14.
142. Id. at *16-*17.
143. See Fonovisa II, 76 F.3d at 263.
144. See Financial Strain, in INFORMATION LAW ALERT: A VOORHEES REPORT, Feb.
9, 1996.
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paid by customers, and "payments for parking, food, and other
services by customers seeking to purchase infringing recordings.' 145
The court called these "substantial financial benefits" that "flowed
directly from customers who want to buy the counterfeit recordings at
bargain basement prices."'146 It rejected the premise that the financial
benefit requirement was only satisfied by the type of benefit in
Shapiro, where the defendant received a percentage of the sales of
infringing items. 147
The court attempted to position its holding atop the long line of
dance hall cases. 148 Again it compared the swap meet scenario to that
in Polygram, where the court concluded that a trade show derived
financial benefit from the attention that attendees paid to the
infringing music played by trade show exhibitors. 149 As noted above,
the court's choice of the reasoning in Polygram over that in Artists'
Management was arbitrary. A closer look at Polygram, however,
reveals other reasons why it should not be used to show that Cherry
Auction had the requisite financial interest in its vendors'
infringement. The court in Polygram noted that the financial interest
in the Shapiro case was the defendant's portion of sales of infringing
goods. 150 It then emphasized the difficulty in finding the direct
financial benefit in cases where there is an infringing performance,
rather than infringing sales, and concluded that the financial benefit of
infringing performances may sometimes be less apparent. 151 The
Polygram court distinguished its case from Shapiro in this way, and
asserted that the financial benefit of infringing performances, much
less measurable than the benefit of infringing sales, must be judged for
"overall commercial benefit to an establishment. '152 Indeed, all of the
cases on which the Polygram court relied involved situations in which
performances of infringing music contributed to the business of the
defendant. 153 In Fonovisa there was no infringing performance; the
145. Fonovisa II, 76 F.3d at 263.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 263 (citing Shapiro, 316 F.2d at 304, in which the defendant received 10 or 12
percent of the sale price of each counterfeit record).
148. Fonovisa II, 76 F.3d at 263.
149. Id. at 263 (citing Polygram, 855 F. Supp. at 1314).
150. Polygram, 855 F. Supp. at 1330.
151. Id. at 1330-31.
152. Id. at 1331.
153. Id. at 1330-31.
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infringement was the selling of counterfeit cassette tapes, which was
very similar to Shapiro. As the Polygram court admitted, this is an
activity for which it is much more easy to tell if there was financial
interest. 154 Based on Shapiro, if Cherry Auction had gained something
from the sale of the tapes, it would have had a direct financial stake. It
did not and therefore fails the "financial benefit" element of the
vicarious infringement test, and Fonovisa should not have been
allowed to sue under this theory.
2. Contributory Infringement Claim
The court next turned to Fonovisa's contributory infringement
claim. 155 The first prong of the contributory infringement test,
knowledge, had been established. 156 Unlike the district court, in
analyzing the second prong of the test for contributory infringement,
the Ninth Circuit chose to focus on Cherry Auction's "material
contribution" to the infringing activity, with little discussion of the
extent to which there was "substantial participation." 157 The court
declared that the support services provided by the defendant, "space,
utilities, parking, advertising, plumbing, and customers," constituted
material contribution to the infringing vendors' activities. 158 This
material contribution, along with knowledge of the infringement,
exposed Cherry Auction to contributory infringement liability.'59
The court cited Columbia Pictures Industries. Inc. v. Aveco.
Inc.160 to support its position that the provision of a site and facilities
for infringing activity can establish contributory liability. 161 Columbia
Pictures, however, does not stand for this principle. It involved a very
154. Id.
155. Fonovisa II, 76 F.3d at 264.
156. Id.
157. Id. Beyond knowledge, the court in Gershwin required, for a claim of contributory
infringement, that a defendant be one who "induces, causes, or materially contributes to
the infringing conduct." Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162. The district court in Fonovisa I
interpreted this prong of the test to mean "substantial participation." 847 F. Supp. at 1496.
Other courts have also found a "substantial participation" requirement. See R&R
Recreation Products, Inc. v. Joan Cook Incorporated, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5176, *7
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (citing Demetriades v. Kaufmann, 690 F. Supp. 289, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)).
But none of these decision are binding on the Ninth Circuit.
158. Fonovisa II, 76 F.3d at 264.
159. Id.
160. 800 F.2d 59 (3d Cir. 1986).
161. Fonovisa II, 76 F.3d at 264.
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different set of facts and a different cause of action. In Columbia
Pictures, the Third Circuit upheld a direct infringement action against
the owners of video stores for their practice of renting rooms in which
rented videos were watched. 162 The Third Circuit was not concerned
with the extent to which Aveco contributed to the infringement of
another, like in Fonovisa. The issue in Columbia Pictures was whether
there had been a public performance of a copyrighted work and, if so,
whether Aveco was a direct infringer by authorizing it.163 Once it was
established that playing a video in a rented room was a public
performance, it was clear that Aveco had authorized it, and had
directly infringed the plaintiffs copyrights.164 Aveco's entire business
practice was thus deemed to be infringing activity.165
Fonovisa is totally different. There is no question that
infringement occurred at Cherry Auction. The issue is whether the
Cherry Auction's connection to the infringement is sufficient to hold it
responsible under the doctrine of contributory liability. The Ninth
Circuit strayed too far when it relied on Columbia Pictures, which
should have no bearing on Fonovisa.
III
How Fonovisa May Affect OSP Copyright Infringement
Liability
A. How Fonovisa Extended Existing Third-Party Infringement Doctrine
From the moment it was issued, spectators recognized that the
Ninth Circuit's Fonovisa opinion could effect OSP liability. 166 The
opinion has been recognized as an extension of existing contributory
and vicarious infringement law.167 David Nimmer has noted
Fonovisa's liberalization of vicarious liability standards. 168 There are
162. Columbia Pictures, 800 F.2d at 60.
163. Id. at 62.
164. Id. at 64.
165. Id.
166. Jeanne E. Sullivan, Copyright for Visual Arts in the Digital Age: A Modern
Adventure in Wonderland, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 563, 589 (1996); When is a Flea
Market like CompuServe?, INFORMATION LAW ALERT: A VOORHEES REPORT, Feb. 9,
1996.
167. David Goldberg and Robert J. Bernstein, Contributory Liability for Swap Meets,
Internet Providers, N.Y.L.J., May 17,1996, at 3.
168. David Nimmer, Brains and Other Paraphernalia of the Digital Age, 10 HARV. J.
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several ways that Fonovisa extends the boundaries of third-party
infringement liability, and puts OSPs in greater jeopardy of being sued
for their users' infringement.
First, Fonovisa extends the concept of contributory infringement
by solidifying the principle that "substantial participation" need not
be substantial at all. It appears, following Fonovisa, that providing
very basic facilities to a flat-rate tenant can constitute enough
"material contribution" to warrant contributory liability for
infringement. The "material contribution" provided by the Cherry
Auction, listed by the court as "space, utilities, parking, advertising,
plumbing, and customers," 169 is little more than what an indoor
shopping mall might provide its tenants. Fonovisa thus shrivels the
"substantial participation" element of the test, rendering it nearly
meaningless. It seems, after Fonovisa, that for a landlord, knowledge
of infringement along with some minimal provision of amenities is
enough to constitute contributory infringement. Second, Fonovisa
extends the contours of the "control" prong of the vicarious liability
test. 170 Fonovisa seems to stand for the principle that the "control"
element is satisfied by any level of control beyond that which a
landlord has over a leasehold tenant. Apparently, after Fonovisa, the
rationale behind the landlord-tenant cases does not extend very far.
Any theoretical right to supervise, whether practical or not, removes
the situation from the landlord-tenant domain. 171
The final, and most dangerous, way that Fonovisa extends
liability is through its holding that Cherry Auction received direct
financial benefit from its vendors' infringement, and thus satisfied the
"financial interest" element of the vicarious infringement test.172 This
does away with the long-standing notion that a landlord with no stake
in the profits of infringement is not vicariously liable. The Fonovisa
holding establishes that the financial benefit prong can be satisfied by
financial gains that are theoretical, unquantifiable, minor, and
remotely related to the infringement. 173 Again, the shopping mall
analogy is appropriate: A shopping mall may benefit financially from
customers attracted by a popular tenant. Should this make the mall
LAW AND TECH. 1, 34 n.142 (1996).
169. Fonovisa II, 76 F.3d at 264.
170. See Self, supra note 96.
171. See Goldberg & Bernstein, supra note 167, at 3.
172. Fonovisa II, 76 F.3d at 263.
173. See Goldberg & Bernstein, supra note 167, at 3.
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jointly and severally liable for tenant copyright infringement, if it
could be argued that the infringing tenant attracted customers with
the popularity of an infringing item?
B. How the Fonovisa Holding Threatens OSPs.
The facts of Fonovisa are oddly easy to analogize to an OSP case.
Cherry Auction indiscriminately rented space on its lot to anyone who
wanted to sell things to the -eneral public, and allowed general public
access to the swap meet.17 4 Similarly, an OSP sells the use of its
facilities to anyone seeking the ability to communicate with the online
world, perhaps even leasing space on a hard drive for a user to store
items that can be accessed by the general public. An OSP then
indiscriminately allows the public to access the files posted by its
users, or stored on its servers. Cherry Auction had theoretical,
contractual control to police its grounds, but it would have been
difficult to actually patrol the swap meet for intellectual property
violations. 175 Similarly, an OSP usually maintains contractual
agreements with customers that allow the OSP to cancel accounts at
the OSP's discretion, but it is extremely difficult to actually control
the flow of information passing through computer networks, and it
would be nearly impossible to prevent users from infringing
copyrights.
Because of this easy comparison, courts may be tempted to apply
the rule of Fonovisa to an OSP faced with an infringement suit. There
are several ways the new Fonovisa easy-to-satisfy third party
infringement doctrines are a threat to OSPs.
First, Fonovisa bolsters the notion that the "substantial
participation" doctrine is very easy to satisfy.176 If the minimal
provision of services offered by Cherry Auction was sufficient
"material contribution" to subject it to contributory infringement
liability, then surely the host computers and modems offered by an
OSP are also sufficient to establish liability. Indeed, Netcom seems to
be consistent with this view.177 With these cases, it seems that an OSP
will be automatically liable for infringement if the OSP has been
warned that infringement is occurring.
174. Fonovisa 11, 76 F.3d at 261.
175. Id. at 262.
176. Id. at 264.
177. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1375.
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Second, and more ominous, is the extension of vicarious
infringement fashioned in Fonovisa. This could be particularly
troublesome for OSPs. Nimmer warned that the application of
vicarious liability laws to OSPs is an invitation to "massive
lawsuits... suffocating the Net through the blind flailing of
pre-cyberspace principles.' 178 Vicarious liability would hold OSPs
responsible for infringement about which they have no knowledge
whatsoever. In Netcom, the court dismissed the vicarious liability
claim, based on the established doctrine that those in Netcom's
position received no financial gain from infringement. 179 But Fonovisa
eviscerates this doctrine, and seems to stand for the principle that any
remotely related financial gain can be attributed to the occurrence of
infringement. If decided after the Fonovisa decision, the outcome of
Netcom might have been different, and Netcom, along with all other
OSPs, might be facing claims for both contributory and vicarious
infringement.
The Fonovisa decision that Cherry Auction is liable for vicarious
infringement, because it had the contractual ability to suspend
vendors, is also harmful to OSPs. It means that OSPs with any sort of
contractual right to control user accounts automatically meet the
"control" prong of the vicarious infringement test. Fonovisa thus
bolsters the opinion of the Netcom court that Netcom had control over
its customers. The Netcom court merely said that it was a question of
fact as to whether or not Netcom had control. 180 It never resolved this
issue.
C. Why it is Dangerous to Extend OSPs Liability for User Infringement
There are many reasons why the Fonovisa standards for
third-party infringement will be injurious to OSPs. Some have noted
that strict standards of liability will dampen one of the greatest gifts of
new information technology - quick, easy, inexpensive dissemination
of information. 181 It has been argued that promoting easy access to
information is the very reason for our copyright law, and expansive
doctrines of contributory and vicarious liability create a disincentive
for OSPs to use their systems to facilitate the easy spread of
178. See Nimmer, supra note 168, at 34.
179. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1377.
180. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1376.
181. Mary Brandt Jensen, Is the Library Without Walls on a Collision Course with the
1976 Copyright Act?, 85 L. LIBR. J. 619 (1993).
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information. 182 At a minimum, holding OSPs liable for user
infringement will raise the cost of online access for all, as the cost will
have to be spread among all users. 183 Smaller OSPs, unable to afford
the risks of infringement liability, may be forced out of business,184
leading to concentration in a business that has been characterized by
intense competition and corresponding low prices.
IV
Recommendation
This note does not argue that new rules are needed to govern
infringement in the information age. OSPs do not need new statutes
or novel legal doctrines to protect them. Instead, existing law should
be applied very carefully.
.The Fonovisa court went too far in its zeal to, punish Cherry
Auction. Ideally, the Fonovisa interpretation of copyright law should
be rejected, as it makes the world a much easier place in which to be
unfairly held liable for someone else's copyright infringement. At a
minimum, the Fonovisa expansive view of third party liability should
not be used against OSPs haphazardly. Courts need to clearly
articulate that a website is not like a swap meet stall. Most
importantly, it must be clarified that OSPs do not satisfy the "financial
benefit" prong of the vicarious infringement test simply because some
infringement may occur on their systems. Unless an OSP is clearly
profiting from infringement, by either receiving a share of
infringement profits or by receiving a large percentage of income from
users who seek access to infringing materials, it should not be held
vicariously liable. Additionally, when determining whether an OSP is
liable for contributory infringement, courts should carefully consider
whether the "control" prong is truly satisfied. For an OSP, the ability
to terminate a user for, say, discourteous behavior, is not the same as
the ability to stop all copyright infringement.
182. Pomeroy, supra note 4.
183. Wendy M. Melone, Note, Contributory Liability for Access Providers: Solving the
Conundrum Digitalization Has Placed on Copyright Laws, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 491, 505
(1997).
184. Id.
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [VOL. 19:921
V
Conclusion
Fonovisa is not all bad. The case was a victory for the music
industry, for which piracy is a persistent and pervasive problem. And
Cherry Auction was not an innocent victim of a bad interpretation of
the law. It was aware that its vendors were infringing, and was sued
only after failing to take any steps to assist in stopping the
bootleggers. Even if it was not legally bound to do so, it should have
assisted in stopping blatant copyright infringement occurring on its
grounds.
But in fashioning a remedy for Fonovisa, the Ninth Circuit went
too far. It twisted third party infringement doctrine into new shapes.
From the old tools it has fashioned new ones, capable of things for
which the originals were not designed. In attempting to hold Cherry
Auction liable for its unethical behavior, the court turned a new class
of parties into potential copyright infringers.
These jurisprudential changes wrought by the Ninth Circuit are
dangerous, as they put OSPs, whose legal responsibility for
infringement is uncertain, in a precarious new position of potential
liability. The courts should reject any careless application of the rule
of Fonovisa to OSPs.
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